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Abstract The extractive sector now holds an even more pre-
dominant position for national economies following the adop-
tion of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. The sector
can make significant contributions to the achievement of a large
number of these Goals. Managing extractive resources has al-
ways presented a major challenge for many countries world-
wide, but especially in the developing world. This paper docu-
ments the shortcomings of the existing governance architecture.
It builds on the ‘social licence to operate’ and draws from its
limitations to propose a new framework called the ‘sustainable
development licence to operate’. The latter is a holistic multi-
level and multi-stakeholder governance framework aimed at
enhancing the contribution of the mining sector to sustainable
development. It is not intended to function as a licence in the
regulatory sense. The underlying principles, policy options and
best practices that form the basis of the proposed framework are
outlined in the paper. This analysis should be viewed as a
starting point, in recognition that the development of a robust
sustainable development licence to operate depends on an open
and inclusive approach to populating its normative content.
Keywords Extractive sector . Mining . Governance .
Resource curse . Sustainable development goals . Social
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Introduction
Mineral wealth, if managed prudently, presents enormous op-
portunities for advancingsustainabledevelopment, particularly
in low-income countries. The extractive sector has been identi-
fied as an important contributor to the achievement of all 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by UN
Member States in 2015.1 Mining can impact most directly the
Global Goals relating to poverty eradication, decent work and
economic growth, clean water and sanitation, life on land, sus-
tainable and affordable energy, climate action, industry and in-
frastructure, as well as peace and justice (UNSDSN 2015).
Recent data published by the International Council of
Mining and Minerals (ICMM) clearly shows the potential role
of mining in national economies (ICMM 2016). For the
poorest countries in the world, the sector can be a driver for
economic growth and improved welfare of its people. The
2016 mining contribution index, which ranks 183 countries
in the world according to the mining sector’s contribution to
1 On 25 September 2015, the 193 member states of the United Nations (UN)
adopted a new Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda features 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 Targets, which UNMember
States have committed to implement by 2030. The 2030 Agenda succeeds the
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which included commitments
to achieve by 2015 outcomes focusing on extreme poverty and hunger, prima-
ry education, gender quality and empowerment of women, child mortality,
maternal health, diseases, environmental sustainability and global partner-
ships. The 2030 Agenda differs from the MDGs in several key respects—it
applies to all countries, recognises a wider range of economic, social and
environmental objectives, and defines specific means of implementation.
Progress towards the Agenda’s 17 Goals and 169 Targets will be assessed
using a suite of indicators, agreed in preliminary form in March 2016.
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the domestic economy, shows that six of the top ten countries
are in Africa.2 In addition to generating vast sums of govern-
ment revenues, extractive projects can also generate benefits
by creating employment, fostering demand for domestic
goods and services, transferring technologies and know-how,
and building infrastructure.
Notwithstanding, mineral-rich nations are confronted with
serious challenges in attempting to translate natural resource
wealth into long-term inclusive and sustainable development.
The phenomenon of resource-rich countries being unable to
transform their mineral resource endowments into enhanced
growth and well-being for their citizens has received consid-
erable attention in the literature, referred to as the ‘resource
curse’ or ‘the paradox of plenty’.3
It has long been recognised that governance is key for miti-
gating the adverse impacts of mining and for enhancing its
positive economic, social and environmental outcomes.
Nevertheless,mostexistingpolicyframeworksand instruments
for governing the mining sector tend to present piecemeal ef-
forts and, importantly, often fail to be implemented at the na-
tional level. This means that new governance approaches and
instruments have not succeeded in bringing about a transition
away from the ‘extractivist’ and anthropocentric model widely
prevalent in the developing world, whereby the extractive sec-
tor is anenclavewith fewlinkages to the local economy(Acosta
2013).4 To achieve this, therewould be a need to adopt sustain-
able development approaches basedonnewmetricswhere suc-
cess is measured on the strength of economic outcomes, sound
environmental management, the respect of social values and
aspirations and the observance of the highest governance and
transparency standards. This more holistic approach is at the
core of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) adopted in February
2009,whichargues thatmineral resourcescancatapultAfrica to
broad-based development and structural transformation
(African Union 2009).
Insofar as these issues are currently taken into account in
the governance of resource extraction, it is largely through the
so-called Social Licence to Operate5 (SLO). However, in re-
sponse to the new imperatives set by the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development and the inadequacies of the current
paradigm, this paper calls for the SLO to be developed into a
new multi-level, holistic and integrated governance frame-
work, applicable to governments, companies and the range
of stakeholders involved in the mining sector, which is here
referred to as the ‘Sustainable Development Licence to
Operate’ (SDLO),6 and which is designed to function as a
normative reference point for the multiple actors concerned
with the extractive sector, and support their efforts to work
together in a manner compatible with the SDGs.
This paper firstly briefly describes the SLO and some of the
criticisms that have been made of it (Section 2), followed by
the changes in the international context and emerging chal-
lenges that have rendered the SLO somewhat outdated
(Section 3). After examining the nature of the current gover-
nance architecture in the extractive sector, the paper then sets
out the key principles and policies that underlie the proposed
SDLO (Section 4), together with some of the implications for
the reform of resource governance to which they give rise,
followed by some concluding remarks (Section 5).
The social licence to operate
Since the late 1990s, mining companies have increasingly
sought to secure the acceptance of mining activities by local
communities and stakeholders, build public trust and prevent
social conflict (Prno 2013). Such attempts to earn a SLO are
premised on engagement between mining companies, govern-
ments and civil society to ensure that mineral resource extrac-
tion contributes to national and local development, and that
damaging impacts on host communities and the environment
are mitigated or otherwise managed.
The social licence to operate can be credited with drawing
attention to the need for mining companies to bear responsibil-
ity for the negative social implications of their practices and to
engage in an inclusive and meaningful way with stakeholders.
Companies are expected to respond to concerns and requests by
affected communities (including indigenous peoples) and
broader civil society, provide timely and understandable infor-
mation, deliver on their commitments, and operate in an honest
and responsiblemanner, andbeaccountable.While the abstract
2 The Democratic Republic of Congo comes first with a score of 96.2, follow-
ed by Mauritania (95.6), Burkina Faso (94.0), Madagascar (91.7) and
Botswana (90.7), and Liberia with an index of 89.0 is at the eighth position
(ICMM 2016).
3 Some of the main arguments explaining this paradox are summarised, for
instance, in Stevens et al. (2015).
4 ‘Extractivism’ is defined as ‘those activities which remove large quantities of
natural resources that are not processed (or processed only to a limited degree),
especially for export’ (Acosta 2013, p. 62). A legacy that remains since colo-
nial times, the extractivist mode of accumulation refers to the exploitation of
raw materials needed primarily to fuel the development and growth of
industrialised and emerging nations. It typically generates few benefits for
the host country due to the resulting limited demand for domestic labour,
goods and services; lack of value addition and linkages to the rest of the
economy; depletion of finite resources; environmental destruction; and incen-
tives for ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour which undermine effective and democratic
governance (Ibid).
5 The concept of ‘Social Licence to Operate’ relates to the broad, on-going
acceptance within local communities, and society more broadly, of mining
projects. It can be regarded as a largely intangible agreement between mining
companies and civil society, based on a growing common understanding of the
need for greater public participation in decision-making, a fairer share of min-
ing proceeds, and assurances that mineral development will be conducted
safely and responsibly (see, for instance, Prno 2013). Joyce and Thomson
(2000) consider that the social licence to operate is a metaphor to depict values,
activities and best practices that companies must commit to within society to
ensure that their operations are successful.
6 The term ‘Sustainable Development Licence to Operate’was first introduced
by Pedro (2015).
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nature of this ‘social contract’ does not imply granting a licence
in the legal sense, in some countries social acceptability is a
requirement for mining contracts to be issued.
Despite the term’s widespread uptake by industry and the
aforesaid welcoming attributes, the notion of a social licence to
operate can be criticised on a number of grounds. These relate to
both thesocial licencediscourseand itspractical application (see,
for instance,Owen andKemp2013;BusinessCouncil of British
Columbia 2015).
Firstly, the use of the term ‘licence’ has been seen as mis-
leading, insofar as it is suggestive of the granting of specific
permission for or public acceptance of a mining project, even
if the reality is one of reluctant tolerance or absence of overt
opposition or conflict (Business Council of British Columbia
2015). This can be particularly problematic in certain political
contexts where the public expression of dissent may be ex-
plicitly prohibited or otherwise punishable.
Moreover, the use of the term ‘social’may serve to aggregate
diverging opinions among a diverse or heterogeneous group of
stakeholders, therefore masking some dissenting or marginalised
views (Agrawal andGibson 1999; Owen andKemp 2013; Lesser
et al. 2017). Importantly, the social licence to operate, as its name
suggests, focuses mainly on the social dimension of mining pro-
jects, with less attention paid to the environmental component.
While some environmental concerns may be addressed if raised
by local communities andother actors, the social licence to operate
is far from a comprehensivemeans for protecting the environment
fromthedestructiveandpolluting impactsofmining.This is linked
to a fundamental critique of the social licence framework
emphasisedbyOwenandKemp(2013),which is that itwasdevel-
opedas industry’spragmatic response tobusiness risk. Itsagenda is
limited to accommodating community demands to the minimum
extent necessary to avoidpublic opposition and social conflict, and
the associated costs of reputational damage and operational delays
or disruptions. Its narrow and business-driven agenda means that
the social licence to operate is a deficient framework—both in
theory and practice—for establishing higher standards of social
and environmental performance, and stakeholder engagement for
long-term sustainable development. In the absence of explicit con-
ditions for obtaining the licence, of recognition of reciprocal rights
andof even access to information, the authors argue that the ‘social
licence itself is not only unworkable, but its usage by industry can
result inperverse development outcomes’ andeven run ‘counter to
a sustainable development agenda’ (ibid, p. 31; p. 33). They con-
cluded that ‘nothingshortof amoveawayfromsocial licenceat the
project level is required topave theway for amoreproactive stance
towards sustainable development’ (ibid p. 34).
Imperatives for a new paradigm
The imperative for a new governance framework arises from
the inadequacy of the existing governance landscape,
particularly in light of recent developments in the global de-
velopment agenda, namely the adoption in 2015 of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. The notion of sustain-
able development—integrating the three pillars of economic
development, social inclusion and environmental sustainabil-
ity—has become the organising framework for global coop-
eration and development and is key in framing the discussion.
There is a growing recognition that if wellmanaged, themin-
ing sector can play a positive role in promoting broad-based
development and structural transformation in relevant countries.
Whilemining impacts all 17SDGs tovaryingdegrees, the indus-
trycancontributemoredirectly to the followingeightGoals (1,6,
7, 8, 9, 13, 15 and 16) (UNSDSN 2015).
Mining generates significant revenues through taxes, roy-
alties and dividends for governments to invest in economic
and social development (Goal 1). Mining can help drive eco-
nomic development and diversification through direct and in-
direct economic benefits, the development of new technolo-
gies and by spurring the construction of new infrastructure for
transport, communications, water and energy (Goal 9). It can
alter the lives of local communities, offering opportunities for
jobs and training, while contributing to economic and social
inequities if not appropriately managed (Goal 8). Moreover,
mining requires access to land and water, presenting signifi-
cant and broad landscape impacts that must be responsibly
managed (Goals 6 and 15). Mining activities are also energy
and emissions intensive in both the production and down-
stream uses of mining products (Goals 7 and 13). Finally,
mining can contribute to peaceful societies by avoiding and
remedying company-community conflict, respecting human
rights and rights of indigenous peoples, and by supporting
the representative decision-making of citizens and communi-
ties in extractives development (Goal 16) (ibid).
Despite the potential of the mining sector to act as a catalyst
for growth and development in mineral-rich developing coun-
tries, there are a number of barriers and challenges that may
prevent this potential from being realised. The challenges in-
clude the unevenly distributed and finite nature of mineral
deposits; the volatility of commodity prices which have ex-
posed developing countries to external shocks triggering
macro-economic instability; the difficulties of managing large
and volatile inflows of foreign capital, technical complexities
of large scale projects and limited national capacities; the en-
clave nature of the industry with weak linkages to other eco-
nomic sectors; redefinitions of resource nationalism and the
contours of the social licence to operate, with no clear consen-
sus on what would thus constitute shared value from mining
(CCSI 2016; EY 2015; PWC 2015); lack of accountability,
transparency and risk of corruption; global asymmetries of
power; conflicting stakeholder interests leading to social con-
flict; and lasting environmental damage.
Moreover, it has been argued that technological advances
in the extractive sector could have disruptive impacts on job
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creation, local procurement of goods and services as well as
change production and supply dynamics with profound geo-
political implications (WEF 2016).
In addition, an important issue in several countries is the
discrepancy between formally recognised rights to extractive
resources, and the resource-related expectations anddependen-
cies of local communities (Toulmin and Quan 2000). Many
local communities around the world are highly dependent on
resources (e.g. forests, fisheries, agricultural land) over which
they do not enjoy formal property rights (Palmer et al. 2012;
RRI 2016; Suárez et al. 2009). Economic development policies
inseveral low-andmiddle-incomecountrieshaveinsomecases
facilitated the large-scale acquisition of formal property rights
by commercial sector actors, in particular to enablemining and
plantation agriculture (Cotula et al. 2014, 2009). These acqui-
sitions are often characterised by the involvement of TNCs
which are difficult to regulate for various reasons. Negative
outcomes associated with large-scale property acquisition by
the extractive sector in low- and middle-income countries in-
clude expropriation without adequate compensation of formal
rights held by individuals and communities, extinguishment of
long-standing informal rights held by individuals and commu-
nities, dislocation of local communities from acquired areas,
destructionof local livelihoods,andresourcesdevelopment that
maximises marketable private benefits (e.g. mining) to the det-
riment of public benefits (e.g. access to clean water) (Anseeuw
et al. 2012).
Finally, sustainable development is impeded, not just in
relation to mining, by an incomplete accounting of sector im-
pacts on comprehensive wealth (UNECA 2016). Figure 1 il-
lustrates how economic wealth in comprehensive terms is
composed of three broad categories of capital assets: infra-
structure and financial capital, institutions and communities,
and natural capital including biotic and abiotic components of
the natural environment (see generally MEA 2005; World
Bank 2011; Kumar 2012; Terama et al. 2016). A range of
impacts on institutions and communities and biotic natural
capital assets (including associated flows of ecosystem ser-
vices) are not currently valued in markets and represent
well-known externalities associated with the extractive sector.
When calculating the potential economic benefits of a min-
ing project, both mining companies and governments tend to
greatly exaggerate these by not taking into account environ-
mental and social externalities. Hidden environmental and es-
pecially social costs of mineral extraction are typically
underestimated or not estimated in monetary terms, even
though these may greatly offset the real or perceived econom-
ic benefits of mining activities (Acosta 2013). Natural capital
accounting, the importance of which has been recognised for
African States in the 2012 Gaborone Declaration, can help
make decision-makers aware of the environmental and re-
source impacts of mining, and help them estimate their quan-
titative importance.
In addition, as all countries strive towards achieving sus-
tainable development, it is not yet fully understood how to
accelerate the decoupling of mineral resources use and envi-
ronmental impacts from economic growth, nor how to mini-
mise the negative impacts on developing countries of deep
decarbonisation of global energy systems, and especially ac-
tions that will result in the stranding of fossil fuel deposits.
There is a need to simultaneously achieve the different and not
always aligned, imperatives of resource security and access,
economic development and diversification in resource depen-
dent developing countries, as well as the decoupling of natural
resource extraction and related environmental degradation
from economic progress.
The sustainable development licence to operate
Decision-making in the extractive sector is shaped by a com-
plex global, regional, national and local architecture of rela-
tionships between individuals and institutions. The term
governance refers to the many ways that individuals and in-
stitutions manage their common affairs in this context.
Governance of the extractive sector is a process characterised
by diverse actors, normative frameworks, hierarchical rela-
tionships, and spatial and temporal boundaries. These compo-
nents are summarised below and illustrated in Fig. 2 below.
Fig. 1 Mineral resources in the context of comprehensive wealth
156 Pedro A. et al.
In the following paragraphs, we provide a formative outline
of the SDLO. It should be made clear at the outset that SDLO
is not intended to function as a licence in the regulatory sense
of that term.7 Instead it contains a flexible and coherent col-
lection of principles and policy options, which over time will
give rise to best practice that are practical in nature and appli-
cable in diverse contexts at multiple spatial scales. As illus-
trated in Fig. 3, the SDLO is designed to function as a norma-
tive reference point for the multiple actors concerned with the
extractive sector, enabling them to act in a coordinated and
cooperative manner that supports the achievement of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. This involves building
on the wider suite of relevant priorities, obligations and stan-
dards that are compatible with the SDGs, including but not
limited to those relating to:
& National and regional economic development—including
instruments such as the Africa Mining Vision, Gaborone
Declaration for Sustainability in Africa.
& Environment and climate change—including Paris
Agreement on Climate Change, Convention on Biological
Diversity including the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
& Human rights—including the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights.
& Trade and investment—including agreements of the
World Trade Organisation.
& Industry best practice—examples of initiative setting stan-
dards for industry include the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) and Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
(EITI).
Distilling practical principles and policy options from the
complex of relevant norms is a significant undertaking, and
only a preliminary and indicative attempt is made to do so
here. It will become clear that there is no one-solution-fits-
all, and that a flexible approach is required whereby proposed
policy options and best practices account for and adapt to the
specific socioeconomic, geopolitical, cultural and historical
specificities of each particular area, country and region.
However, the paragraphs that follow sketch out principles
and policy options that are broadly applicable everywhere.
Actors and stakeholder engagement in extractive sector
governance
The governance regime depicted in Fig. 2 operates as a holistic
multi-level complex of formal and informal arrangements,
encompassing governance institutions and mechanisms that act
at the international, regional,national, localandproject levels, and
performed by amultitude of actors (Ekins andO’Keeffe 2014).
These actors include but are not limited to ‘home’ and ‘host’
governments, intergovernmentalorganisations,privatecommer-
cial entities and ‘third’ sector actors such as non-governmental
organisations, and diverse communities within civil society.
Each of these actors pursues different sets of interests at different
spatial and temporal scales, in different social, cultural, political,
economicandenvironmentalcontexts.Acharacteristic featureof
the extractive sector is the influential roleplayedby transnational
corporations (TNCs),8 including state-owned enterprises from
other countries (Cotula 2013; Holden and Pagel 2013;
UNCTAD 2009). The conflicting interests and asymmetries of
information,negotiatingskills, leverageandpowerbetweengov-
ernments, TNCs and communities present important political
economy challenges.
The divergence in expectations between stakeholders has
been a key driver of conflict in the extractive industry. This
happens as certain stakeholders may be excluded from the
decision chain. Stakeholders may also lack knowledge of the
economic specificities of a mining project, fail to collectively
understand how mining can benefit each group and view val-
ue creation as a ‘zero sum’ game of winners and losers (Pedro
2015). A notable attempt by the World Economic Forum to
address this is the Responsible Mineral Development
Initiative, which entails a platform and tool to create a shared
understanding of the benefits and costs of mining, and identify
beneficial solutions (WEF 2017).9
Appropriate governance of mineral resources, so as to en-
hance their contribution towards sustainable development, is a
shared responsibility along the mining value chain. From an
ethical standpoint, developed importing nations should share
responsibility for the adverse social and environmental im-
pacts of mineral resource extraction occurring in mainly de-
veloping exporting countries. A globalmulti-level governance
architecture will therefore need to address not only an agenda
7 Of note is that the choice of the word ‘licence’ in naming the new governance
framework may misleadingly refer readers to the narrow notion of legal or
other formal arrangements between host governments and mining companies.
Yet, it should be clarified that this is but a single dimension of the much
broader and encompassing mineral resource governance architecture
envisioned and set forth in this paper. The wording of ‘sustainable develop-
ment licence to operate’ is rather chosen to connect to and improve on the
industry’s aforementioned established approach of granting a ‘social licence to
operate’ for engaging with stakeholders and improving development in the
sector.
8 TNCs are composed of national entities located in more than one country,
linked together by ownership or otherwise, under a coherent system of
decision-making in which they can exercise significant influence over each
other and share knowledge, resources and responsibilities (Sauvant 2015;
Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003).
9 The initiative adopts a broad view of the value from mineral development,
identifying seven dimensions. These include the revenue streams (through tax,
royalties, levies and fees), employment and skills acquisition, ensuring the
respect for the environment and biodiversity, securing social cohesion and
cultural gains, facilitating the entry of local entrepreneurs in the mining supply
chain, promoting local beneficiation and downstream industry, and optimising
mining infrastructure for development (Pedro 2015).
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for resource security, resource efficiency and decoupling of
resource use and environmental impacts from economic
growth that is of particular importance to developed nations
but also the need for continuous economic development,
structural transformation and economic diversification in re-
source exporting and other developing countries.
The SDLO envisages an inclusive multi-stakeholder ap-
proach, whereby decisions concerning the mining industry
are made with the involvement of stakeholders. All relevant
actors should be included through, among others, information
exchange, media and other campaigns, and collaboration with
institutions such as those with oversight roles. A community-
orientated, context-sensitive approach to engagement requires
in-depth knowledge of local culture, circumstances and power
dynamics, alongside a sophisticated approach to engaging di-
verse voices (including alternative and marginalised voices)
within affected communities (Owen and Kemp 2013). It is
thereby important that industry engages in patient, long-term
and broad-based collaborative social dialogue regarding each
mining project, articulating an agenda which balances its own
commercial needs with managing and meeting broader expec-
tations about the contribution of mining to sustainable devel-
opment (ibid).
Comprehensive, consistent and flexible national
governance regimes
The SDLO can build on a plethora of existing policy options,
initiatives and instruments. Nevertheless, there is a danger of
‘initiative fatigue’ as the ‘proliferation of initiatives and lack
of linkages make it challenging for mining companies to de-
cide which ones to adopt and make a focus on sustainability
more costly to implement’ (Resolve and WEF 2015, p. 6).
Importantly, for many countries, the challenge relates less to
Fig. 3 The Sustainable
Development Licence to Operate
(SDLO)
Fig. 2 Key components of extractive sector governance
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the absence of appropriate constitutional provisions, legisla-
tion, regulations, contracts and licences, but more to the chal-
lenge of enforcing these.
In addition, effective governance of the mining sector re-
quires a legal system that is comprehensive, consistent and
universally applicable to all projects. In addition to adopting
policies/legislation, governments also need to build the insti-
tutional capacity to implement the rules. And rules and insti-
tutions, in turn, need to be supported by a critical mass of
citizen understanding (Collier 2013). They also need to be
appropriate to the local context. Differentiated governance
approaches are needed, for instance, for countries where stan-
dards and guidelines can be easily implemented, compared to
others with a large artisanal and small-scale mining sector, or
with high levels of corruption, or that are affected by conflict
and war. Governance strategies thus need to be tailored to a
particular country’s socioeconomic, geopolitical, historical
and cultural background.
Coherent global governance architecture
Different actors and normative frameworks shape extractive
sector governance at different spatial and temporal scales, in-
cluding local, national, regional and international. The spatial
boundaries of governance at each of these scales are often not
aligned with the biophysical and spatial characteristics of re-
sources, many of which are location-specific point resources.
Mineral resources are concentrated in small areas and are un-
evenly distributed, which means that they must be exploited
where they occur, most often through capital intensive tech-
niques. Yet, many activities in the extractive sector, and im-
pacts of these activities, straddle, migrate across or are affected
biophysically by activity located beyond jurisdictional bound-
aries. A powerful recent example of such impacts is the col-
lapse in November 2015 of a mine-tailing dam in Brazil,
which generated a wave of toxic mud killing 20 people and
severely affecting hundreds of kilometres of river, riparian
lands and Atlantic coast across the two states of Minas
Gerais and Espirito Santo (Couto Garcia et al. 2017).
The ubiquitous movement of extractive resources across
national boundaries is driven by the organisation of produc-
tion, trade and investment into globalised supply and value
chains (Kaplinksky and Morris 2001; OECD et al. 2014).
These chains have diverse characteristics—including different
degrees of complexity, fragmentation, interconnectedness and
resource intensity, and different structures of control and own-
ership (OECD 2013).
The management of mineral resources therefore requires
interventions of different actors in different spatial horizons
in both ‘home’ and ‘host’ countries. Setting clear legislative
and political boundaries with regards to these strategic re-
sources is important. Nigeria, for example, has legislated to
include a minimum 13% derivation rule in its Constitution, for
allocating oil and gas revenues to the nation’s oil-producing
states. Despite the introduction of such an instrument for the
fairer distribution of extractive revenues between national and
local governments, this has nevertheless led to unequal reve-
nue transfers and failed to avert militant struggle in the Niger
Delta (Iledar and Suberu 2010).
Relevant normative frameworks
Decision-making by different actors concerning the extractive
sector is enabled, constrained and influenced by a wide variety
of normative frameworks. More formal normative frame-
works include treaties, constitutions, laws, policies, regula-
tions, contractual agreements and technical standards. Less
formal normative frameworks include administrative, com-
mercial, professional, cultural and interpersonal practices.
The past two decades have also witnessed a plethora of
domestic, regional and international legal and regulatory
frameworks as well as formal and informal initiatives aimed
at better governing the extractive industry for increased eco-
nomic prosperity and environmental protection. These include
many commendable examples such as the Africa Mining
Vision, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI),
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
the Model Mining Development Agreement, the Initiative for
ResponsibleMining Assurance, the Natural Resource Charter,
the development of indicators tomeasure resource governance
and the broader work of the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM).
In distinguishing between different normative frameworks,
these include international agreements, national legislation
and standards of practice.
International agreements establish a basic architecture of
extractive sector governance at a global level, through the
recognition of several general rights and obligations of nation
states. For example, States are afforded permanent sovereign-
ty over extractive resources within their respective territories,
and sovereignty or sovereign rights over certain extractive
resources depending on where they are located offshore.
National laws, policies and regulations establish detailed
frameworks concerning rights to extractive resources, man-
agement and development of the extractive sector taking into
account impacts on the environment and other economic sec-
tors, and the allocation of associated benefits and impacts. An
important issue in several countries is the discrepancy be-
tween formally recognised rights to resources, and the
resource-related expectations and dependencies of local com-
munities (Toulmin and Quan 2000).
Voluntary and private standards—As mining companies
have sought to earn a ‘social licence to operate’, this has resulted
in an explosion of soft regulation in recent years (Pedro 2015).
Such voluntary initiatives are aimed at addressing potential
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consequencesofminingon theenvironment (for instance,owing
to tailing spills, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion,
water depletion andCO2emissions), poverty and inequality, em-
ployment and inflation, immigration, displacement, loss of an-
cestral lands and livelihoods and other human rights violations.
Relationships—Both actors and normative frameworks are
influenced and shaped by relationships of power, authority, coop-
eration or influence at multiple levels. These relationships can be
hierarchical, or cooperative and voluntary. The prominent and
influential role of private transnational entities, including TNCs,
not-for-profit organisations andother formalised partnerships and
associations, is a defining feature of extractive sector governance
in recent decades. The ability of TNCs to influence extractive-
sector decision-making across globalised value chains depends
on the governance structure of the chain in question. The afore-
mentioned asymmetry of power betweenTNCs, government and
communities, for instance, may prevent local communities from
exercising their rights and developing country governments from
securing a ‘fair’mining deal. Different value chain structures af-
ford different degrees of power and influence to TNCs. Figure 4
presentsfivewell-knownillustrativemodesofinteractionbetween
different private sector actors within globalised value chains, and
corresponding degrees of power asymmetry and coordination.
Extractive sector value chains tend to be characterised by high
levelsofintegration,withtransnationalminingcompaniesexercis-
ing a high degree of coordination and power over private sector
activities in the relevantvaluechain.Anumberofextractivesector
TNCs participate in collaborative networks designed to promote
better governancewithin and across global value chains—a focal
point being the International Council forMining andMetals.
Whiledomestic lawsandpolicies are critical inmanagingmin-
ingoperations, rents and investment inhost countries, there is also
an important role to be played by home countries and the wider
international community. A number of proposals have been put
forward for improving the governance of resources (including
mineral resources) at the global level in support of sustainable
development. These range from the creation of extended sustain-
able commodity agreements to an International Convention on
Sustainable Resource Management, an Integrated Resource
Management Agency and an international metals covenant
(Ekins and O’Keeffe 2014; Bleischwitz and Bringezu 2007;
Bleischwitz et al. 2012; Wilts and Bleischwitz 2012). Proposals
for suchglobal governance regimes for sustainable resourceman-
agement should complement other related arrangements in the
mining sector and aim to promote mineral resource sufficiency
and security of access, the decoupling of mineral resource use
and impacts from economic growth, and the contribution ofmin-
eral resources to the achievement of the SDGs.
Transparency and accountability
A new governance approach must recognise that although
appropriate legal, regulatory and voluntary frameworks and
instruments may to a large extent already be in place to govern
the mining sector, the problem is all too often the uneven or
outright lack of their enforcement. In order to implement laws
and policies governing the mining sector, transparency is an
essential, even if not a sufficient, prerequisite.
Transparency is also important for helping to combat ills
associated with transfer mispricing (whereby governments
may lose out on tax revenues owing to the distorted prices
applied to transactions within TNCs) and illicit financial flows
(amounting to estimated annual losses of over 50 billion in
Africa) (UNECA 2015).
The transformations that occurred in the marketplace due
the financialisation of commodity markets are a cause of great
debate. A key concern is the potential perverse impacts in
commodity price formation, particularly those arising out of
speculative practices which exacerbate price volatility and
lead to price distortions (Cheng and Xiong 2014; Heumesser
and Staritz 2013). In developing countries, this can lead to
significant difficulties in managing macro-economic imbal-
ances driven by volatile export revenues, changes in the bal-
ance of payments and public finances as well as in inflation
and exchange rates.
The issue of transparency has received significant attention
in international policy circles, and there have been some no-
table advances in this field, including the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI), mandatory disclosure require-
ments in the European Union and the USA, as well as numer-
ous national initiatives (Kaufman 2014). Several valuable di-
agnostic tools have also been developed, including the
Resource Governance Index.10 Yet, analysis using this tool
shows that fewer than 20% of resource relevant countries
displayed adequate quality of transparency and accountability
(Revenue Watch Institute 2013) (see Fig. 5).
Further inroads have to be made to increase transparency in
a number of areas across the value chain, including mining
contracts and licences, social and environmental impact as-
sessments, royalties and tax payments at the project level, as
well as state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds and
beneficial ownership of mining companies (Kaufman 2014).
In this endeavour, responsibility does not only rest with gov-
ernments and industry but also with countless other non-
governmental actors, who include unions, non-governmental
organisations, think thanks and academics, and who can share
public auditors’ burden, analysing data, reporting on findings,
and demanding more accountable governance and manage-
ment in the mining sector (ibid).
10 The Resource Governance Index (RGI) has been developed by the Revenue
Watch Institute and assesses the quality of four key governance components:
institutional and legal setting, reporting practices, safeguards and quality con-
trols, and enabling environment. It further includes information on state-
owned companies, natural resource funds and subnational revenue transfers
(Revenue Watch Institute 2013).
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While greater transparency is critical for ensuring account-
ability and hence successful policy implementation, it also has
to be accompanied by efforts to fight corruption, improve the
rule of law, and protect civil and political rights (including
press freedom) (Kaufman 2014). These are important prereq-
uisites for effective governance of the mining sector to ensure
companies commit to the highest environmental, social and
human rights standards, and the sector contributes towards
sustainable development.
Support for broad development objectives, including
poverty reduction, economic diversification
and structural transformation
In establishing a new governance framework for the mining
sector, it is essential to understand the sectorwithin the broader
context of a national economy, and its development objectives
and strategies. Thismeans bothmanaging the potential impacts
of mineral resource extraction on other parts of the economy
(such as on the artisanal and small-scalemining sector), aswell
as maximising linkages between the mining sector and other
parts of the economy (including through job creation, local
procurement of goods and services, the downstream use of
mined goods, and shared infrastructure). This will require a
long-term comprehensive strategy, going beyond industry reg-
ulation toalso include investment ineducationand training, and
other policies for creating an enabling environment.
In the case of low-income resource-rich countries, governance
strategies need to focusonbreaking away from the enclave nature
andextractivistmodeloftheminingsector.Countriesneedtobuild
forwardandbackwardlinkageswithothersocioeconomicsectors,
build infrastructure and capacity for greater value addition along
thevaluechain,andpromoteregionalpartnershipsandintegration.
A range of structural reforms and industrial policies need to be
implemented to help achieve structural transformation and eco-
nomic diversification. Developed countries and the global com-
munityneed toafforddevelopingcountries sufficientpolicyspace
to do so, including through reform of the international trade and
investmentregimethatconstrains theuseof thefull rangeofpolicy
instruments toachieveresource-based industrialisationat the local
level (Acosta 2013; UNECA andAfricanUnion 2011).
TheAfricaMiningVision (AMV)presents one such compre-
hensive governance framework that extends beyond the narrow
confines of the mining sector, to also advocate for linkages to
 
Fig. 5 Mapping the governance deficit. Source: NRGI 2013, pp. 12–13
 
Fig. 4 Interaction between private sector actors within global value chains. Source: adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005)
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other sectors, diversification, development of socioeconomic in-
frastructure and regional integration. The AMVAction Plan,
which is structured around programme clusters, specific goals,
outcomes and activities, was developed in 2011 for the practical
applicationof thevisionfor thecontinent.TheAMVActionPlan,
which is structured around programme clusters, specific goals,
outcomes and activities, was developed in 2011 for the practical
application of the vision for the continent (Pedro 2016).
A result-oriented monitoring framework has also been de-
veloped toassessAMVcompliance, asmeasuredby the levelof
implementation of the 83 activities recommended by theAMV
ActionPlan(GIZ2014).Approachessuchas theAMVcouldbe
replicated in other regions and implemented at the national lev-
el.Another example of a suggested comprehensive approach to
governance of the extractive sector is the Natural Resource
Charter, which is a set of 12 precepts that put forward choices
and strategies in order to increase the sustainable development
benefits of natural resource exploitation. An accompanying
Benchmark Framework has also been developed as a tool for
the management of oil, gas and minerals against global best
practice as prescribed in the Charter (NRGI 2016).
Systems thinking
In addition to examining the inter-linkages between the min-
ing sector and other socioeconomic sectors, there is also a
need to look at the dynamic relationships between minerals
and other natural resources such as land, energy and water.
Extractive industries place large demands on these resources,
risk polluting water resources and can lead to biodiversity loss
and ecosystem destruction. This calls for a systems-thinking
approach that accounts for the nexus between resources so as
to steer policy efforts towards integrated natural resourceman-
agement along the mining value chain.
In this context, strategic environmental impact assessments
and integrated spatial planning or landscape planning are crucial
toensure that aminingproject effectivelycontributes to local and
national development. These instruments help protect local hab-
itats, manage forests andwater resourcesmore sustainably, arbi-
tratebetweenconflicting landuseoptionsandreducepovertyand
improve the livelihoods of local communities.
Inclusiveness and reduced gender and other inequalities
An important element of the SDLO is recognition that mining
activities can impact men and women in a different manner.
Special attention should be paid to the role of women in arti-
sanal and small-scale mining, their growing portion of em-
ployment in large-scale mining, and the adverse environmen-
tal and social impacts of mining that can disproportionately
affect women. Examples of the latter include the impact of
deforestation on women’s ability to collect water and fuel, or
the rise of prostitution to serve mine workers and associated
risks of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. A
gender lens therefore needs to be adopted in governing the
mining sector in order to maximise its development contribu-
tion, whilst also promoting female empowerment and gender
equality that are central to the achievement of the SDGs.
A similar need for differentiated analysis and policies may
also arise with respect to other groups, such as indigenous
people, who may be marginalised.
Potential policy instruments
The principles outlined above would need to be operationalised
through a range of policies along the entire mining value chain
(that is, from licencing of mineral terrains, geological mapping,
mineral exploration, mine development, mining, mineral pro-
cessing and refining, ore transportation, manufacturing of end-
use products, to recycling and mine closure). Van der Lugt
(2014), based on Gunningham and Grabosky (1998), summa-
rises examples of policy and regulatory instruments that can be
applied in anappropriatemixofmandatoryandvoluntary instru-
ments, creating both carrot and stick incentives, to advance the
environmental performance of the sector.
On command and control regulation, possible instruments
include environmental standards (e.g. process standards, tech-
nology standards, performance standards), permits and li-
cences (e.g. point source or facility), and covenants (negotiat-
ed agreements, co-regulation). Economic and market-based
instruments vary and include property rights, market creation,
fiscal instruments (e.g. taxes, charges, subsidies), financial
instruments, liability instruments, performance bonds, deposit
refund systems (solid waste), removing perverse subsidies and
sustainable procurement. On self-regulation (industry group
or social control), there are standards and codes of practice.
Voluntarism can also be practiced at the individual firm level
or in the context of corporate social responsibility. Education,
capacity building and information instruments include educa-
tion and training, corporate environmental reporting, commu-
nity right to know and pollution inventories, product verifica-
tion and labelling, and award schemes (Van der Lugt 2014,
based on Gunningham and Grabosky 1998).
There is a strong case for governing the extractive indus-
tries through detailed robust laws and regulations, rather than
reliance on the negotiation of extensive and complex individ-
ual mining contracts as is often the case in developing coun-
tries. Contracts should as far as possible be consistent with the
general legislative framework, include standardised terms,
avoid stabilisation clauses, be allocated through a competitive
bidding process and be accessible in the public domain.11 This
11 The Mining Law Committee of the International Bar Association has de-
veloped a comprehensive and common template to aid developing countries
negotiate and agree a mining contract that supports the contribution of the
project towards sustainable development (see www.mmdaproject.org).
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can help the government maintain a coherent strategy for the
sector and broader economy, reduce the challenges associated
with the negotiation of each project (particularly amid
asymmetries in negotiating skills and leverage), facilitate ef-
fective rule enforcement by easing the work burden of regu-
latory and oversight bodies, and increase transparency and
accountability (UNSDSN 2015).
Support for broad development objectives is likely to re-
quire a coherent formulation and coordinated implementation
of a wide range of policies, which may relate to such issues as
local content, shared infrastructure, international trade, invest-
ment, industrial policy, education and training, and many
others, and which can help strengthen institutions, build ca-
pacities and create an enabling environment.
At the global level, policy action is needed for setting glob-
al standards in the form of rules and regulations, voluntary
initiatives and reporting obligations in areas that include:
& coordination of mining policies and initiatives and agree-
ment on international mining standards [including
pressurising transnational corporations (TNCs) to disclose
information and adhere to global codes of conduct, and
ensuring host countries receive a fair deal];
& influencing incentives and behaviour (examples of poli-
cies being extended consumer responsibility and eco-
labelling of metals);
& technology transfer; and
& regulation of the financialisation of commodities, and to cur-
tail illicit financial transactions, transfer-pricingabuse, useof
tax havens and other tax evasion or avoidance techniques.
The World Bank has developed a value chain approach for
the extractive industries aimed at supporting countries trans-
late mineral and hydrocarbon wealth into sustainable develop-
ment, shown in Fig. 6.12
Policies need to be designed at each of the illustrated different
stages of the extractive sector value chain, which for space limi-
tation are not described further. The implementation of the vari-
ous policy options identified will differ from country to country
dependingon the local context, but somepolicieswill very likely
be required at each of the identified stages of the value chain.
Upward harmonisation of best practices
A number of authors have recognised the need to achieve the
upward harmonisation of global standards of good practice for
the mining sector to contribute to sustainable development (see,
for example, Nickless et al. 2015). What is required is a set of
international guidelines for what is acceptable, for instance, in
terms of environmental, social and human rights impacts of min-
eral extraction, getting a fair deal and share of profits, profit repa-
triation, transparency and accountability, and investing in the fu-
ture and in support of sustainable development objectives, along
the linesdiscussedabove.Theguidelineswouldneed tobeused to
set clear and concrete benchmarks for countries and companies to
aim for.A formalmandate could be given to an institution such as
the InternationalOrganisation forStandardisation todevelopsuch
global standards and benchmarks of good practice, which will
need to include new reporting guidelines (for example those of
the Global Reporting Initiative—GRI), and sustainability indica-
tors (such as the Responsible Mining Index being developed by
the ResponsibleMining Foundation).
Concluding remarks
The paper argues that despite themany challenges and complex-
ities ofmanaging extractive resources, there are also tremendous
opportunities from using mineral resource wealth to spearhead
sustainable and inclusive development. Examples of countries
suchasBotswana today,and theNordiccountriesand theUSAin
the last century provide evidence that resource riches can act as
positive drivers (and not a ‘curse’) for the required structural
transformation towards sustainabledevelopment.Butwhat these
country examples alsohighlight is the importance of governance
Fig. 6 Value chain for extractive
industries. Source: World Bank
(2009). http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTOGMC/
Resources/ei_for_development_
3.pdf
12 This framework was popularised by Collier (2007), with several institutions
such as the Revenue Watch Institute, the World Bank, the Natural Resource
Governance Institute and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) having since developed similar value chain approaches for the extrac-
tive sector.
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for achieving positive economic, social and environmental out-
comes. Governments need to put in place clear, comprehensive
and transparent laws, policies and regulations, build strong insti-
tutions, train skilled professionals and set up accountability
mechanisms to ensure that policy frameworks and rules are im-
plemented. At the same time, the challenges associated with ris-
ing resource nationalism, policy revisionism (including fromde-
nials of climatechange), volatile commodityprices and threats to
multi-lateralism would need to be overcome. This will require
close collaboration and cooperation between countries and ac-
tors, with all relevant stakeholders incorporating the principles
enshrined in the SDGs into their own practices and operations.
Thisnewgovernanceparadigmhasherebeencalleda ‘sustain-
able development licence to operate’, as a development of the
‘social licence to operate’ paradigm, to reflect the significant po-
tential contribution of the mining sector to realise the sustainable
development of mineral-rich developing countries. The new par-
adigmextends overmultiple dimensions (local, national, regional
andglobal) and calls for the reconciliation of the aspirations of the
different actors (including multi-national companies, govern-
ments, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisa-
tions and land users) in the extractive sector to ensure shared ben-
efits from mining. The underlying principles and policy options
outlined above,which form the basis of the proposed framework,
should serve as useful benchmarks for its operationalisation.
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